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11 Introduction
During the 70s and 80s most OECD countries experienced an increase in the supply of
educated workers.1 Despite this increase, the education premium rose substantially in the
U.S. during this period.2 Empirical studies on the education premium in Europe o⁄er a
di⁄erent and mixed picture: In general, a substantial increase in the education premium
is documented for the U.K., while the increase is smaller or even inexistent in many other
European countries, such as France, Germany, and Sweden.3 Common explanations for the
U.S. experience are skill-biased shifts in the labor demand (e.g., Bound and Johnson (1992)
and Berman et al. (1994)), increased trade with developing countries (e.g., Wood (1994)),
and institutional changes, such as changes in the minimum wage legislation or the decline
in unionization (Di Nardo et. al. (1996) and Lee (1999)). As regards real wages, the U.S.
and the European experience also di⁄er. Real wages of high paid workers increased in both
Europe and the U.S. during the 80s. By contrast, real wages of low paid workers increased
in most European countries, but decreased in the United States.4
The present paper makes three contributions. First, it o⁄ers a new explanation for why
an increase in the supply of highly educated workers may lead to an increase in the education
premium. Second, it shows that such an increase may raise real wages of highly educated
workers but lower real wages of less educated workers. These two results match the U.S.
experience of increased education premium and lower real wage for the less educated workers.
Third, by introducing ￿ring costs which are thought as higher in Europe than in the U.S.,
we can also account for the di⁄erent evolution of relative and real wages in Europe.
The key determinant of wage inequality in our sequential search model is the ￿rm￿s threat
point in the wage bargaining. The equilibrium wage is equal to a fraction of the worker￿s
marginal product less the ￿rm￿s threat point in bargaining. An increase in the ￿rm￿s threat
point reduces real wages for all workers by the same amount. Hence, real wages of less
educated (productive) workers decrease more and wage inequality increases. Based on this
mechanism, we explore the short and long run impact of an increase in the supply of highly
1See e.g., Katz et al. (1995), Nickell and Bell (1995), Abraham and Houseman (1995), and Card et al.
(1996).
2See e.g., Katz and Murphy (1992), Juhn et al. (1993), and Levy and Murname (1992).
3See Davis (1992), Nickell and Bell (1995), Abraham and Houseman (1995), Card, et al. (1996), Gottschalk
(1997), and Machin and Van Reenen (1998).
4OECD Job Study (1994, Chapter 1)
2educated workers in the absence of ￿ring costs as well as in the presence of ￿ring costs.
In the absence of ￿ring cost the ￿rms￿ threat point is simply their outside option, i.e. the
value of a vacancy. In the short-run where the number of ￿rms and the amount of physical
capital is given, an improvement in the quality of the labor force raises the value of a vacancy.
This increases the ￿rms￿ threat point which in turn increases wage inequality.
In the long run there is free entry of ￿rms, and ￿rms choose the amount of physical capital
prior to being matched with a worker. When the ￿rm can redeploy (even a small part of)
the physical capital if a match breaks down during bargaining, the ￿rm￿s threat point in the
bargaining corresponds to the positive value of the capital that the ￿rm can redeploy. Under
the assumption of complementarity in production between physical and human capital, ￿rms
invest more in physical capital after an increase in the supply of highly educated workers.
The larger capital stock increases the ￿rms￿ threat point and hence leads, ceteris paribus,t o
lower wages and to more wage inequality. There is, however a counterveiling e⁄ect: More
investments in physical capital also raises the workers￿ productivity, which increases wages.
The outside option e⁄ect always dominates for workers with low levels of education and their
real wages decrease. In contrast, the productivity e⁄ect may exceed the outside option e⁄ect
for highly educated workers, and consequently their real wages may increase.
Firing costs which are not transfers to workers, e.g. administrative costs, lower the ￿rms￿
threat point in wage bargaining. When ￿ring costs are proportional to the average produc-
tivity in the economy, an increase in the education level of workers increases both the value
of a vacancy and the ￿rms￿ ￿ring costs. The net impact on the ￿rms￿ threat point depends
on the magnitude of the ￿ring costs. When ￿ring costs are low, the net e⁄ect of an increase
in the supply of highly educated workers is positive, and wage inequality increases. Other-
wise, the net e⁄ect on the ￿rms￿ threat point becomes smaller and may even be negative.
Consequently, an increase in the supply of highly educated workers attenuates the trend to
more wage inequality or may even reverse it. Firing costs also a⁄ect how real wages change in
response to an increase of highly educated workers. As above, the threat point may decrease
when ￿ring costs are large, and the wages of all workers increase. When ￿ring costs depend on
the cause of separation a novel result obtains: Firing costs associated with separation during
bargaining increase real wages, while ￿ring costs associated with exogenous job destruction
reduce real wages.
Several recent papers show that an increase in the supply of highly educated workers
3may increase wage di⁄erentials. In Caroli and Van Reenen (1999) and Beaudry and Green
(1998), changes in wage inequality are driven by organizational changes. In Acemoglu (1999),
Duranton (1997), and Rioux (1995), an increase in the supply of skilled workers leads to a
higher degree of labor market segregation which increases inequality and lowers the wages of
workers with low education levels. Machin and Manning (1997) and Albrecht and Vroman
(1999) examine wage inequality in a model where some workers cannot perform all jobs. An
increase in the supply of highly educated workers induces some ￿rms to switch from the low
education to the high education segment. This improves the prospects for highly educated
workers to such an extent that their relative wage increases. In the absence of ￿ring costs,
our model generates similar results but it relies on a di⁄erent mechanism than the above
models. An increase in the supply of highly educated worker a⁄ects real and relative wages
because it changes the ￿rm￿s threat point in wage bargaining.
Like the present paper, Acemoglu (1997) also establishes a link between the ￿rms￿ outside
option and wage inequality. Studying the evolution of income inequality, he ￿nds that wage
inequality rises at high levels of inequality but diminishes at low levels. Contrary to the
present paper, he does not examine the impact of an increase in the supply of highly educated
workers on real and relative wages.
Finally, none of the above papers considers ￿ring costs, which are key in our model to
explaining the diverging evolution of wage inequality in the U.S. and Europe. Previous papers
that analyze ￿ring costs focus on the relationship between ￿ring costs and (un-)employment
levels or unemployment duration.5 An exception is Mortensen and Pissarides (1999b). Their
analysis di⁄ers from the present one in several respects. In particular, they consider how
changes in wage inequality following a skilled biased technical change varies with the level of
￿ring costs.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the basic model. Section 3 analyses
the e⁄ect of an increase in the supply of highly educated workers on wage inequality and real
wages in the absence of ￿ring costs. Section 4 examines the model with ￿ring costs. Section
5 generalizes the model and discusses the robustness of our results. Section 6 concludes.
5See e.g., Blanchard (1997), Burda (1992), Bertola (1990), and Saint-Paul (1995).
42T h e m o d e l
2.1 Workers and rms
Our model extends the standard continuous time search model with sequential search and
wage determination by Nash-bargaining, as in e.g., Pissarides (2000). Workers are in￿nitely
lived, risk neutral, and have a discount rate r. They di⁄er in their educational level h.T h e
education level is distributed on the support [h;h] with density function f(h) and distribution
function F(h).
Firms are identical, risk-neutral, and have the same discount rate r as the workers. A
production unit consists of one worker with human capital h and k units of physical capital
and generates an output y = h‚k1¡‚. In the short run, the number of ￿rms and the amount
of physical capital are given. In the long run there is free entry, and ￿rms choose the level
of physical capital. Following Acemoglu (1996, 1997, 1999), ￿rms make their investments in
physical capital (e.g., buildings, equipment) before being matched with a worker.
Assumption 1 When a ￿rm and a worker separate, the entire physical capital can be rede-
ployed in the next match.
This Assumption simpli￿es the analysis but is unnecessarily restrictive as shown in section
5. To obtain our results it su¢ces that the ￿rm can redeploy part of the capital k if that ￿rm
and its worker were to separate during bargaining. This ensures that the ￿rm￿s threat point
in bargaining depends in the long run on the physical capital.
We de￿ne the aggregate education level in the economy by E(h‚)=
R h
h h‚f(h)dh and
denote it by " = E(h‚). If a distribution F0 ￿rst order stochastically dominates a distribution
F1, i.e., F0(h) >F 1(h) for all h, then " is lower for the distribution F0 than for F1.
2.2 Matching
Workers are either unemployed or employed, and jobs are either vacant or occupied. Only
unemployed workers and vacant jobs engage in search. Let u denote the number of unem-
ployed workers, v the number of vacancies, and ￿ = v=u the tightness of the labor market.
Unemployed workers and vacant jobs match randomly according to a constant returns to
scale matching function M(u,v). Hence, the rate at which a vacant job is matched with an
unemployed worker is M(u;v)=v = q(￿), and the rate at which an unemployed workers is
matched with a vacant job is M(u;v)=u = ￿q(￿). As is commonly assumed, the matching
5function satis￿es q0(￿) < 0 and
d￿q(￿)
d￿ = ￿q0(￿)+q(￿) > 0. These restrictions imply that a
tighter labor market makes it more di¢cult for ￿rms to ￿ll a vacancy but easier for workers
to ￿nd a job. Employed workers separate from jobs at an exogenous rate –, and the workers￿
income ￿ow while unemployed is normalized to zero.
Since the value of a vacancy may in equilibrium exceed zero, ￿rms may not want to employ
all workers at a wage that the workers accept. We abstract from issues of employability of
workers with low education levels and focus on wage inequality.6
Assumption 2: All matches result in employment.
This is tantamount to assuming that there exist a positive wage for a worker with human
capital h, at which ￿rms prefer to hire him relative to keeping the position vacant. In
Appendix A we derive the restrictions on the parameter values such that Assumption 2 holds
in equilibrium. A su¢cient condition for this to hold is that h is su¢ciently large relative to
"1=‚.
2.3 Asset values and wages
In general asset values and wages depend on the level of physical capital. Initially, we derive
the asset values and wages under the assumption that all ￿rms have the same level of physical
capital. Denote by Uh and Wh the present discounted income of an unemployed and employed
worker with education level h. In steady state, Uh satis￿es
rUh = ￿q(￿)[Wh ¡ Uh]: (1)
At a rate ￿q an unemployed worker ￿nds employment in which case the present discounted
income increases by Wh ¡ Uh. Analogously, the present discounted income of a employed
worker with human capital h satis￿es
rWh = wh + –[Uh ¡ Wh] (2)
where wh denotes the wage of a worker with education level h.
Denote by V the value of a vacancy, by Jh the value of a position occupied by a worker
with human capital h,a n db yJe the expected value of an occupied position. If the ￿rm and
6The issue of changes in employability and/or in reservation wages of di⁄erent groups in response to changes
in the composition of the work force is studied in Acemoglu (1999), Albrecht and Vroman (1999), and Rioux
(1995).
6the worker separate, the ￿rm is left with the value of a vacancy.7 In steady state, V and Jh
satisfy8
rV = q(￿)[Je ¡ V ] (3)
and
rJh = yh ¡ wh + –[V ¡ Jh]: (4)
Wages are set by Nash-bargaining. The worker￿s (resp. ￿rm￿s) bargaining power is ﬂ
(resp. 1¡ﬂ), and the parties outside options (Uh and V ) are their threat points in bargaining.
Hence, the wage of a worker with education level h is determined by
Max
w ›(w)=( Wh ¡ Uh)ﬂ(Jh ¡ V )1¡ﬂ. (5)
Solving the maximization problem, using (4) and (2) yields
wh =( 1¡ ﬂ)rUh + ﬂ(yh ¡rV): (6)
Using (1) and (2), we can solve for rUh as a function of wh
rUh =
￿q(￿)wh
r + – + ￿q(￿)
: (7)
By inserting (7) into (6) we obtain a wage equation
wh = ﬂ
r + – + ￿q(￿)
r + – + ﬂ￿q(￿)
(yh ¡ rV): (8)
Equation (8) shows that wages are ceteris paribus increasing in the productivity of the worker
and decreasing in the ￿rm￿ outside option (threat point) V .
3 Wage Inequality and Real Wages
In this section we ￿rst derive the e⁄ects of changes in the education level on relative wages in
the short and in the long run. Next we examine the e⁄ects on real wages. Finally, we relate
the predictions of the model to empirical ￿ndings.
7To be precise, the ￿rm is left with max (V;0). In the cases that we consider, the value of a vacancy is,
however, never negative.
8For simplicity, we abstract from ￿ow search costs of ￿rms. Incorporating search costs would not change
our qualitative results, though the expressions would become more cumbersome.
73.1 Wage Inequality
We refer to wage inequality ! as the ratio of the wage of a worker with human capital h(1+¿)








Proposition 1 Wage inequality increases with the ￿rms￿ threat point in bargaining.
Proof. Follows directly from (9).
Wages are composed of one part that is proportional to the individual productivity and
of another part that is inversely related to the ￿rms￿ threat point in bargaining, V . Ceteris
paribus, an increase in the ￿rms￿ threat point leads to a larger proportional reduction in
the wage of workers with lower education levels. Proposition 1 is, however, merely a partial
equilibrium result, as it treats the value of a vacancy as an exogenous variable.
We now turn to the determination of the value of a vacancy. We denote the expected
average productivity in the economy by ye, and the expected productivity in ￿rm j by ye
j
(Although they coincide in equilibrium, it is nonetheless important to have separate notation
because ye is exogenous to the ￿rm.) Denote by we
j the expected wage in ￿rm j. Using (3)





r + – + q(￿)
: (10)
In the short run the amount of physical capital and the number of ￿rms is given. Without
loss of generality, all ￿rms are assumed to have an identical amount of physical capital k.
Accordingly, the ￿ow of production of a worker with human capital h is given by yh = h‚k
1¡‚.
Inserting (8) into (10) and using that all ￿rms are identical yields,




r(r +– +( 1¡ ﬂ)q(￿)+ﬂ￿q(￿))
:
Lemma 1 In the short run V is linear and increasing in ".
8Proof. Follows directly from (11), from ye = k
1¡‚E(h‚)=k
1¡‚", and from the fact that
the number of ￿rms is given, i.e., ￿ = ￿.
Given the sharing rule of the surplus from a match, a ￿rm earns higher pro￿ts when
employing a better educated (more productive) worker. Hence, when the expected education
level of a worker increases, the expected pro￿ts from ￿lling a vacancy also increase.
Proposition 2 In the short run an increase in the aggregate education level increases wage
inequality.
Proof. Follows immediately from Proposition 1 and Lemma 1.
Proposition 2 is an immediate consequence of the positive relationship between the value
of a vacancy and the aggregate education level and of the positive relationship between wage
inequality and the ￿rms￿ threat point in bargaining.
Consider now the long run case where ￿rms choose the level of physical capital, and where
there is free entry of ￿rms. As ￿rms invest in physical capital before being matched with
a worker, the investment level depends on the distribution of human capital. Consequently,
the amount of physical capital is independent of the employed worker￿s type. Recall that the
entire physical capital can be redeployed after separation (Assumption 1).
Let pk denote the cost of physical capital, where p is the price of capital and k is the
amount of capital. Free entry implies that the tightness of the labor market ￿ is endogenous.
Firms enter until the value of a vacant position equals the cost of opening a vacancy, i.e.,
V (￿;k)=pk
where V (￿;k) is given by (11).





r + – +( 1¡ ﬂ)q(￿)
: (12)
When choosing the physical capital stock, ￿rms take ￿ and rUe as given and maximize Vj¡pk.




9This simply means that the marginal cost of capital equals its expected marginal return.
Using equation (13) and (12) gives




(1 ¡ ‚)(1 ¡ ﬂ)q(￿)
r(r + – +(1¡ ﬂ)q(￿))
.
The function ⁄(￿) is decreasing in ￿. From the above equation it follows that for a given ￿
the cost of the physical capital is proportional to ye
j. Since V = pk in equilibrium, the long
run value of a vacancy is also proportional to ye








It follows directly that higher aggregate education levels induce ￿rms to invest more for a
given ￿. Since ￿rms invest prior to being matched, all choose the same amount of physical
capital in equilibrium.
Having determined the optimal capital level and hence the long run equilibrium value of a
vacancy as a function of ￿, we turn to wage inequality. Substituting the free entry condition





h‚(1 + ¿)‚ ¡ r⁄(￿)"
h‚ ¡ r⁄(￿)"
: (16)
Proposition 3 In the long run an increase in the aggregate education level increases wage
inequality.
Proof. Proposition 3 follows directly from (16) and from the fact that ￿ is unique and
independent of F(h) (see Appendix B).
A higher education level increases the optimal amount of physical capital, which in turn
increases both the productivity of each worker and the value of a vacancy. While the former
decreases the wage inequality, the latter increases it. The productivity of each worker is
proportional to k1¡‚, while the value of a vacancy (the ￿rm￿s threat point) is proportional to
k. Hence, the impact of k through the ￿rm￿s threat point outweighs the e⁄ect through the
worker￿s increased productivity. This implies that wage inequality increases with the level of
physical capital.
103.2 Real Wages
Like relative wages, real wages depend in our model on the ￿rms￿ threat point in bargaining.
From equation (8), it is immediate that real wages are decreasing in the value of a vacancy.
(Recall that labor market tightness ￿ is given in the short run and independent of F(h) in
the long run, as shown in Appendix B).
Inserting V = ￿(￿)ye as de￿ned in equation (11) into equation (8) we obtain the short
run wage equation
wh =
r + – + ￿q(￿)
r + – + ﬂ￿q(￿)
ﬂ(h‚k
1¡‚ ¡ r￿(￿)ye). (17)
Proposition 4 In the short run the real wage for a given education level h decreases after
an increase in the aggregate education level.




r + – + ￿q(￿)





For a ￿x level of capital
dye
d" > 0 and hence dwh
d" < 0.
Equation (18) implies that an increase in " lowers all wages by a quantity which is inde-
pendent of the workers￿ education level. This is again due to ￿rms￿ improved threat point in
bargaining.
In the long run the free entry condition V = pk must hold, where pk =⁄ ( ￿)ye. Inserted
into equation (8), this gives
wh =
r + – + ￿q(￿)
r + – + ﬂ￿q(￿)
ﬂ(h‚k1¡‚ ¡ r⁄(￿)ye):




r + – + ￿q(￿)
r + – + ﬂ￿q(￿)
ﬂ
"‚
((1 ¡‚)h‚k1¡‚ ¡ r⁄(￿)ye): (19)
The overall e⁄ect is ambiguous. On the one hand, the larger amount of physical capital
increases wages. On the other hand, the ￿rms￿ higher threat point decreases wages.
Lemma 2 (i) dwh
d" > 0 for h>b h and dwh






Proof. Follows directly from (19).
In Appendix C it is shown that h<b h is consistent with employability. Under the as-





r+–+ﬂ￿q(￿) ((1 ¡ ‚)h
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¡‚ @k










"‚, and obtain equation (19).
11Proposition 5 In the long run real wages increase for workers with high education levels
after an increase in the aggregate education level, while they decrease for those with low levels
of education.
Thus, our model is compatible with real wage increases for workers with high education
levels and decreases for workers with low education levels.10 Notice, however, that the model
predicts an increase (decrease) in real wages for all education groups if b h<h(b h>h).
3.3 Evolution of relative and real wages in the U.S., Canada, and Europe
In the absence of ￿ring costs our model predicts that an increase in the supply of highly
educated workers leads to an increase in the education premium (both in the short and in
the long run). Real wages may also increase for workers with high levels of education, while
they decrease for those with low levels.
As discussed in the introduction, the supply of educated workers increased during the 70s
and 80s in U.S., Canada, and Europe. The evolution of real and relative wages was, however,
markedly di⁄erent. In terms of relative wages, the U.S., Canada, and the U.K. experienced
a large increase in the education premium in the 1980￿s and 1990￿s. At the same time the
increase was smaller or even negative in many European countries.
Real wages also have followed a di⁄erent evolution in the these countries. In summary, real
wages have increases for workers with high education (wage) levels while they have decreases
for those with low education (wage) levels in the U.S. and Canada. In the U.K. real wages
have increased for high wage earners while they have been stagnant for low wage earners.
In most Continental European countries real wages have increased for all education (wage)
groups during the 80s.
Gottschalk (1997) ￿nds that the weekly earnings of college graduates rose by 5% in the
U.S. during the period 1979 to 1994, while those of high school graduates declined by 20%.
Card et al. (1996) ￿nd that real wage of male employees declined for most age-education
cells between 1979-89 in the U.S.. For Canada, they document a decline for the low wage
10Explanation based on technological progress are di¢cult to reconcile with the latter. In the simplest
partial equilibrium model, skilled and unskilled workers have to be net-substitutes to generate a decline in
real wages of unskilled workers when the productivity of skilled workers increases due to (biased) technical
progress, (see e.g. Wasmer (2001)). Krusell et al. (2000) examine the capital-skill complementarity in detail
but focus exclusively on the skill premium without discussing real wages.
12age-education cells (over the period 1981-88), but an increase for the high wage age-education
cells.11 They did not ￿nd any correlation between the initial wage and the real wage increase
in France (between 1982 and 1989). Evidence from other Continental European countries
gives a similar picture. Beaudry and Greene (2000) report that real wages increased for
German male workers between 1983 and 1996 for virtually all education levels, while in the
U.S. real wage declined between 1979 and 1996 for male workers with less than 16 years
of schooling (see their Figures 1 and 2). The OECD Job Study (1994) documents that real
wages of low paid (and high paid) workers increased during the 80s in Europe. Machin (1996)
￿nds for the period 1978-92 that there was essentially no wage growth for the 10th percentile
and that the real wages of the 50th and 90th percentile grew substantially in the U.K..
Overall, the predictions of our model ￿t the ￿ndings about the evolution of relative and
real wages in the U.S., Canada and the U.K.. As far as Continental Europe is concerned,
additional features need to be added to our model to account for the reported evidence. This
is done in the next section.
4 Firing taxes
To explain the di⁄erent evolution of real and relative wages in the U.S. and Europe, we
extend our model and introduce an institutional feature which distinguishes these two groups
of countries. One such institutional feature often used to explain di⁄erences between the
U.S. and European labour markets are unemployment bene￿ts.12 We consider employment
protection legislation instead.
Following Mortensen and Pissarides (1999a), we subsequently restrict attention to ￿ring
costs that are not redistributed to workers (as opposed to transfers to workers). We refer to
such costs as ￿ring taxes. Transfers to workers tend to be neutral with respect to employment
and reduce wages proportionally. By contrast, ￿ring taxes have a much more complex impact,
as shown by e.g. Burda (1992), Lazear (1990), and more recently Ljunqvist (2001). Based
on the OECD Employment Outlook (1999), Pissarides (2001) summarizes the strictness of
employment legislation by a 0-6 index (6 being the strictest legislation): The index is 2.5 for
11The authors have divided the labor force in sub-groups of age and education (age-education cells). They
position the labour force on the x-axis according to the initial wage and on the y-axis according to the wage
increase. (See their ￿gures 4-6).
12Two recent papers relying on this di⁄erence are Ljunqvist and Sargent (1998) and Hassler et al.(2001).
13the EU, 2.6 for Germany, 2.8 for France, 0.9 for the U.K., 1.1 for Canada, and 0.7 for the
US. In addition, Pissarides (2001) de￿nes three types of employment protection which cannot
be considered as transfers: Administrative procedures, di¢culties of dismissal (challenge by
the employee for unfair dismissal, etc...) and additional measures for collective dismissal.
These three measures are summarized by an administrative index which equals 2.7 for the
EU, 3.4 for Germany, 2.7 for France, 1.0 for the UK, 1.4 for Canada and 0.7 for the U.S.. It
seems thus fair to argue that ￿ring costs and ￿ring taxes are higher in Continental European
countries than in the U.S., Canada, and the U.K.
We now derive the predictions of the model when ￿ring taxes are taken into account.
Denote by T the cost incurred by the ￿rm in case of separation. Furthermore, we assume
that ￿ring taxes are indexed on the average productivity in the economy.13
Assumption 3: T = tye
Other speci￿cations of ￿ring taxes and transfer costs (severance payments) are discussed
in Appendix F. Equation (1), (2), and (3) remain unchanged. The ￿ow value of a position
occupied by a worker with human capital h becomes
rJh = h‚k1¡‚ ¡ wh + –[V ¡ T ¡ Jh]. (20)
The ￿rms￿ threat point in bargaining is now V ¡ T.14 The wage of a worker with human
capital h, is now determined by
Max
w ›(w)=( Wh ¡ Uh)ﬂ(Jh ¡ V + T)1¡ﬂ: (21)
A wage equation is obtained by solving (21), using (2) and (20).
wh =( 1¡ﬂ)rUh + ﬂ(h‚k1¡‚ ¡ r(V ¡ T)): (22)
Inserting the expression for rUh (equation (7)) into (22) gives
wh = ﬂ
r + – + ￿q(￿)
r +– +ﬂ￿q(￿)
‡
h‚k1¡‚ ¡r(V ¡ T)
·
. (23)
13This assumption ensures that the level of unemployment is independent of the productivity of the workers,
which is a desired long-run property of the model. For a discussion of the invariance of the unemployment
rate to technology in the long-run, see Layard et al. (1991, ch. 1) and Pissarides (1990, ch. 2).
14Mortensen and Pissarides (1999a, 1999b) and Saint-Paul (1995) also use this speci￿cation of the ￿rms￿
threat point.
144.1 Relative Wages and Firing Taxes





h‚(1 + ¿)‚k1¡‚ ¡ r(V ¡ T)
h‚k1¡‚ ¡ r(V ¡ T)
: (24)
As before, wage inequality increases with the ￿rms￿ threat point in bargaining. The threat
point depends positively on the value of a vacancy. In addition, it is now inversely related to
the ￿ring tax.
In the short run the number of jobs (and hence ￿) and the amount of physical capital is
given. For simplicity, all ￿rms are endowed with the same amount of physical capital.
Lemma 3 In the short run higher ￿ring taxes reduce wage inequality.
Proof. The value of a vacancy is equal to (see Appendix D)
V = ye￿(t;￿) (25)
where
￿(t;￿)=
(1 ¡ ﬂ)q(￿) ¡ q(￿)t(ﬂr+ – + ﬂ￿q(￿))
r(r + – +( 1¡ ﬂ)q(￿)+ﬂ￿q(￿))
:
Note that ￿(0;￿) · ￿(￿) as de￿ned in Section 3. The value of a vacancy V is proportional
to ye and decreasing in t. The Lemma follows directly from (24) and the fact that V is
decreasing in t for ￿ = ￿ and k = k.
Higher ￿ring taxes reduce wage inequality through their direct e⁄ect on the ￿rm￿s threat
point. In addition, they reduce the value of a vacancy which reinforces the direct e⁄ect.
Higher ￿ring taxes lower the value of a vacancy because they increase the dead-weight loss
associated with exogenous separation and because they lower the ￿rms￿ threat point in bar-
gaining. To our knowledge, the result that ￿ring taxes reduce wage dispersion has not been
explicitly made in the literature.
Using (24), V = ye￿(t;￿),a n dT = tye, wage inequality ! in the short run can be
rewritten as
! =
h‚(1 + ¿)‚ ¡ r(￿(t;￿) ¡ t)"
h‚ ¡r(￿(t;￿) ¡ t)"
which is increasing in " if and only if ￿(t;￿) >t, V> T.
Proposition 6 In the short run an increase in the aggregate education level reduces wage
inequality when ￿ring taxes are high. The reverse holds when ￿ring taxes are low.
15Proof. Follows directly from the above equation.
Given that ￿ring taxes are by assumption proportional to the average productivity, they
increase with the workers￿ education level. Since ￿ring taxes decreases the ￿rm￿s threat point
in the bargaining, the e⁄ect of an increase in the supply of highly educated workers on the
wage inequality is reduced, or may even be reversed if the ￿ring taxes are su¢ciently high.
In the long run ￿rms choose the amount of physical capital k, and the free-entry condition
V (￿;k)=pk holds. The expression for V (￿;k) is given by (25). It can be shown that in
equilibrium pk =⁄ ( ￿)ye; i.e., the FOC is the same as in the previous section.15 Using that





h‚(1 + ¿)‚k1¡‚ ¡ r(⁄(￿) ¡ t)ye
h‚k1¡‚ ¡ r(⁄(￿) ¡ t)ye =
h‚(1 + ¿)‚ ¡ r(⁄(￿) ¡ t)"
h‚ ¡ r(⁄(￿) ¡t)"
: (26)
The wage inequality ! i saf u n c t i o no f￿, h;";(⁄(￿) ¡ t) and ¿:
Proposition 7 In the long run an increase in the aggregate education level reduces wage
inequality when ￿ring taxes are high. The reverse holds when ￿ring taxes are low.
Proof. Follows directly from equation (26) and from the fact that ￿ is unique and indepen-
dent of F(h) (see Appendix E).
Even though the ￿rms￿ threat point depends on ￿ring taxes and on the physical capital
stock, the intuition is similar to that of Proposition 3. Consider the case with low ￿ring
taxes, i.e., V ¡ T>0.A s " increases, ye increases both directly and through the larger
amount of physical capital. Since the threat point V ¡ T is proportional to ye and positive,
it increases with the educational level ". Ceteris paribus, this implies that wage inequality
increases. There is, however, a counterveiling e⁄ect. When the education level increases,
workers become more productive due to higher k, which lowers wage inequality ceteris paribus.
The productivity of each worker is proportional to k1¡‚, while the threat point is proportional
to ye = "k1¡‚. This implies that the e⁄ect of an increase in " on the threat point (through
" directly and k) outweights the e⁄ect of the workers￿ increased productivity. Hence, for low
￿ring taxes an increase in the educational level increases inequality. By contrast, when ￿ring
taxes are high, i.e. V ¡T<0, both the e⁄ect on productivity and on the ￿rms￿ threat point
mitigate wage inequality. Consequently, an increase in the education level decreases wage
inequality when ￿ring taxes are high.
15Use equation (22) and (29) in appendix and note that ￿ring costs are exogenous to the ￿rm.
16In summary, our model with ￿ring taxes predicts that an increase in the education level
increases wage inequality when ￿ring costs are low, while the reverse holds when ￿ring costs
are high. These results ￿t well with the di⁄erent evolution of relative wages in Continental
Europe versus the U.S., the U.K., and Canada.
In addition, the introduction of ￿ring taxes allows us to relate wage inequality to job
creation and destruction costs. Since V is equal to the creation costs of a vacancy pk and
since T is the destruction costs, changes in wage inequality following an increase in the
educational level are a positive function of the di⁄erence between creation and destruction
costs.
4.2 Real Wages and Firing Taxes
The derivation of real wages with ￿ring taxes is immediate from the previous analysis. In all
expressions for wages ￿(￿) is replaced by ￿(t;￿)¡t in the short-run, and ⁄(￿) is replaced by
⁄(￿) ¡t in the long run.
Proposition 8 In the short run an increase in the aggregate education level increases real
wages for a given education level when ￿ring taxes are high. The reverse holds when ￿ring
taxes are low.
Proof. Di⁄erentiating (23) with respect to ", and using that V = ye￿(t;￿), k = k and










d" < 0 if ￿(t;￿) ¡ t>0 and dwh
d" > 0 if ￿(t;￿) ¡ t<0.
When ￿ring taxes are low, the ￿rms￿ threat point in the bargaining increases, and the
wage for a given education level decreases after an increase in ". The reverse holds when
￿ring taxes are high.
The long-run impact of a higher " on real wages is found by di⁄erentiating equation (23)




r + – + ￿q(￿)
r +– + ﬂ￿q(￿)
ﬂ
"‚
((1 ¡ ‚)h‚k1¡‚ ¡ r(⁄(￿) ¡ t)ye): (27)
When ￿ring costs exceed the value of a vacancy (i.e. (⁄(￿)¡t) < 0), wages increase with the
education level, because each worker￿s productivity increases (due to an increase in k), and
16The algebra is analogous to that in section 3.2.
17because the ￿rms￿ threat point decreases. When the value of a vacancy exceeds the ￿ring costs
(i.e. (⁄(￿) ¡ t) > 0), the e⁄ect on real wages is ambiguous. The larger amount of physical
capital increases wages, but the ￿rms￿ higher threat point decreases wages. Analogous to
Lemma 2 we have the following result.
Lemma 4 : (i) When ⁄(￿) ¡ t>0 dwh
d" > 0 for h>b h(t) and dwh







Proof. Follows directly from (27).
Under the assumption that h>b h>hwe can summarize the long run equilibrium
outcomes.
Proposition 9 In the long run an increase in the aggregate education level increases real
wages for workers of all education levels when ￿ring taxes are high. When ￿ring taxes are
low real wages increase for workers with high education levels but decrease for workers with
low education levels.
The impact of an increase in education depends on the size of the ￿ring taxes. If ￿ring
taxes are high real wages increase for all workers. If ￿ring taxes are low and h>b h>hthe
wages of workers with low education levels decrease but the wages of highly educated workers
increase.17
Our model thus ￿ts well the Continental European evolution of real wages, as well as the
divergence from the experience in the U.S., Canada and the U.K. due to di⁄erences in job
protection.
5 Robustness and generalization
Here we examine to what extent our results rely on the assumptions regarding ￿ring costs
and full redeployability of physical capital (zero replacement cost). Our results hold under
alternative speci￿cations of both the ￿ring costs and replacement costs. In addition, these
robustness checks show that the impact of costs di⁄er with the cause of separation and that
changes in wage inequality following an increase in the aggregate education level depends on
the relation between job creation and job destruction costs.
17Analogous to section 3 the model with ￿ring taxes predicts an increase (decrease) in real wages for all
educational groups if b h<h(b h>h).
18Consider a modi￿ed version of the model in which part of the physical capital has to
be replaced when ￿rm and worker separate and in which the size of both replacement costs
and ￿ring taxes depend on the cause of separation. Denote by R– replacement cost after
an exogenous job destruction (–-separation) and by Rﬂ the replacement cost after separation
during bargaining (ﬂ-separation). Although ﬂ-separations never occur in equilibrium we have
to consider them to determine the ￿rm￿s threat point. Let Tﬂ denote the ￿ring taxes in case
of a ﬂ-separation and T– the ￿ring taxes in case of a –-separation. Both ￿ring taxes are
assumed to be proportional to ye. Thus, the framework of section 4 is a special case of the
present one, with R– = Rﬂ =0and T– = Tﬂ.
The modi￿ed equations for real wages and wage inequality are then given by (see Appendix
F)
wh =
r + – + ￿q(￿)
r +– +ﬂ￿q(￿)
ﬂ(h‚k1¡‚ ¡ rV + r¥):
and
!¿ =
h‚k1¡‚(1 + ¿) ¡r(V ¡ ¥)
h‚k1¡‚ ¡ r(V ¡ ¥)
where
r¥=( r + –)(Rﬂ + Tﬂ) ¡ –(R– + T–):
The above equations show that the impact of replacement costs and ￿ring taxes depends on
the cause for separation.
Proposition1 0In the short run costs associated with ﬂ-separations (Tﬂ and Rﬂ) increase
real wages and reduce wage inequality, while the reverse holds for costs associated with –-
separations (R– and T–).
Proof. It follows directly from above equations.
Ceteris paribus, costs associated with ﬂ-separations (Tﬂ and Rﬂ) increase real wages and
reduce wage inequality because the ￿rm￿s threat point is now V ¡ Rﬂ ¡ Tﬂ. By contrast,
costs associated with –-separations decrease real wages and increase wage inequality: They
reduce the value of a match Jh and this reduction is independent of worker￿s education level
h. Ljunqvist (2001) provides a detailed analysis of the role of ￿ring costs for the labour
market outcome. Allowing for cause-speci￿c ￿ring costs, the above result adds to his analysis
and further clari￿es the impact of ￿ring costs.
As regards changes in relative wages following an increase in the aggregate education level
", appendix F shows that our previous results also obtain in this more general setting. In
19particular, an increase in " raises wage inequality in the long run to the extent that V = pk
exceeds ¥. In appendix F we also discuss the robustness of our results with respect to the
assumption that ￿ring costs are not redistributed to workers and that they are proportional
to the average productivity in the ecomomy ye.
Finally, consider the case where Rﬂ = R– = R and Tﬂ = T– = T, which implies that
¥=T +R. In the long run changes in wage inequality following an increase in the aggregate
education level are then a positive function of the di⁄erence between job creation costs pk
and job destruction costs T and R. This con￿rms our result at the end of section 4.1 in a
more general setting.
6 Concluding comments
Most of the literature explains the U.S. experience of simultaneous increases in the educa-
tion premium and in the supply of highly educated workers in a conventional labour de-
mand/labour supply framework augmented with skill-biased technological changes. Like the
more recent papers cited in introduction, we o⁄er a complementary explanation based on the
existence of search frictions. Our mechanism is, however, novel and operates through changes
in the ￿rms￿ bargaining position following an increase in the supply of highly educated work-
ers. A key insight of the model is that (keeping ￿ring taxes constant) higher overall education
of workers produces positive wage e⁄ects through higher capital accumulation and negative
wage e⁄ects through the ￿rms￿ higher outside options in bargaining. The latter a⁄ects all
workers in the same way, whereas the former a⁄ects more the highly skilled workers due to
the skill/capital complementarity. As a result, higher education results in higher inequality
between skilled workers and unskilled workers. Like skill-biased explanations our theory is
consistent with the observed increase in real wages for highly educated workers in the U.S.
Our theory can also account for lower real wages of the less educated workers. Based on di⁄er-
ent ￿ring costs we provide an explanation for the diverging wage development in Continental
Europe.
A primary objective of this paper is to analyse the impact of an increase in the supply
of highly educated workers on inequality and real wages. Therefore, we have treated changes
in education levels as exogenous to the labour market outcome. Allowing also for a (causal)
relationship between wage levels and supply of educated workers would make for a richer
analysis, including the possibility of multiple equilibira. We leave such a generalization for
20future research. Nonetheless, an increase in the education level may in part be viewed as
exogeneous to the labour market outcome. For instance, if education is a normal good, richer
cohorts will consume more education than poorer cohorts and increasing living standards
may be the rationale for the growing numbers of highly educated workers in OECD labour
markets.
Although testing our theory and its mechanism is beyond the scope of this paper, we
would like to suggest two possible approaches. One approach is to test how changes in cross
country wage inequality depend on improvements in the workers￿ education level and on
di⁄erences in employment protection. This can be considered a test of the reduced form of
the model. Another approach aims at testing the mechanism of our theory more directly.
Using ￿rm level data, one can examine how wages depend on the determinants of the ￿rms￿
outside option, i.e., on replacement and separation costs and on the availability and the
quality of alternative workers.
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A match results in employment if and only if Uh <W h and V< J h. Given Nash-bargaining, this
implies that a worker is employable if and only if Uh + V< W h+Jh. Using (1), (2), (4) and (7) this
condition is equivalent to
rV < yh:
Inserting the expression for rV (equation (11)) yields
(1 ¡ ﬂ)q(￿)ye
r + – +( 1¡ ﬂ)q(￿)+ﬂ￿q(￿)
<y h:
The condition for employability is thus
(1 ¡ ﬂ)q(￿)E(h‚)
r + – +( 1¡ ﬂ)q(￿)+ﬂ￿q(￿)
<h ‚:
B Proof of Proposition 3
Using (11) and (14),
V = pk <=>
(1 ¡ ﬂ)q(￿)ye
r(r + – +( 1¡ ﬂ)q(￿)+ﬂ￿q(￿))
=
(1 ¡ ‚)(1 ¡ ﬂ)q(￿)ye
r(r + – +( 1¡ ﬂ)q(￿))
:
<=>
r + – +( 1¡ﬂ)q(￿)
r +– +( 1¡ ﬂ)q(￿)+ﬂ￿q(￿)
¡ (1 ¡ ‚)=0 : (28)
From (28) it follows that ￿ is independent of F(h).





d￿ (1 ¡ ﬂ)ﬂ￿q(￿) ¡ ﬂ
d￿q(￿)
d￿ (r + – +( 1¡ ﬂ)q(￿))
(r + – +( 1¡ ﬂ)q(￿)+ﬂ￿q(￿))2 :
Since
dq(￿)
d￿ < 0 and
d￿q(￿)
d￿ > 0 , it follows that
dB(￿)
d￿ < 0: As B(￿) is continuous in all its arguments,
it follows from
dB(￿)
d￿ < 0 that the solution to B(￿)=0is unique.
C Proof of that h < ￿ h is consistent with employability
A worker is employable if and only if
h‚k1¡‚ ¡ rV > 0:
Using V =⁄ ( ￿)ye yields
h‚ + r⁄(￿)" > 0:












and hence hmin < b h:
D Proof of Lemma 3
Using (3), (20) and Assumption 3 gives
rV =
q(￿)E(h‚k1¡‚ ¡wh ¡–tye)
r + – + q(￿)
: (29)




(1 ¡ ﬂ)q(￿) ¡ q(￿)t(ﬂr+ – + ﬂ￿q(￿))
r(r + – +( 1¡ ﬂ)q(￿)+ﬂ￿q(￿))
:
Hence Lemma 3 follows.
E P r o o fo fP r o p o s ition 7
From equations (14) and (25), and V = pk follows that the equilibrium ￿ is de￿ned by
(1 ¡ ﬂ)q(￿) ¡q(￿)t(ﬂr+ – + ﬂ￿q(￿))
r +– +(1¡ ﬂ)q(￿)+ﬂ￿q(￿)
=
(1 ¡‚)(1 ¡ ﬂ)q(￿)
r + – +(1¡ ﬂ)q(￿)
: (30)
It is immediate that ￿ is independent of ". Below we show that (30) de￿nes ￿ uniquely. Equation
(30) can be rewritten as
r + – +( 1¡ ﬂ)q(￿)
r + – +(1¡ﬂ)q(￿)+ﬂ￿q(￿)
(1 ¡ t(ﬂr+ – + ﬂ￿q(￿))) ¡ (1 ¡ ‚)=0 :






d￿ (1 ¡ ﬂ)ﬂ￿q(￿) ¡ ﬂ
d￿q(￿)
d￿ (r + – +( 1¡ ﬂ)q(￿))
(r + – +( 1¡ ﬂ)q(￿)+ﬂ￿q(￿))2 (1 ¡ t(ﬂr+ ﬂ￿q(￿)+–))
¡tﬂ
r + – +( 1¡ ﬂ)q(￿)








d￿ > 0, and 1¡t(ﬂr+ﬂ￿q(￿)+–) > 0 at B(￿)=0, it follows that
dB(￿)
d￿ < 0
at B(￿)=0 .A sB(￿) is continuous in all its arguments it follows from
dB(￿)
d￿ < 0 at B(￿)=0 , that
the solution to B(￿)=0is unique.
26F Robustness
First, we analyze the case where the ￿ring taxes depend on the cause of separation and where part
of the physical capital has to be replaced after a separation. Let Tﬂ denote the ￿ring taxes in case
of separation during wage bargaining (ﬂ-separation) and T– the ￿ring taxes in case of an exogenous
destruction (–-separation). Both taxes are again assumed to be proportional to ye.
Assumption 4: Tﬂ = tﬂye and T– = t–ye
As before, the physical capital costs pk have to be paid when opening a new vacancy. In addition,
a fraction of the capital has to be replaced before opening the position after a separation. The replace-
ment cost in case of a ﬂ-separation is Rﬂ, and in case of an –-separation R–, where Rﬂ = ‰ﬂpk and
R– = ‰–pk: We further assume that ‰ﬂ < 1 and ‰ﬂ • ‰–. These assumptions capture the idea that
physical capital has some value, even if the worker leaves during wage bargaining, and that a larger
fraction has to be replaced after an exogenous shock.
Equation (1), (2), and (3) remain unchanged. The ￿ow value of a position occupied by a worker
with human capital h becomes
rJh = h‚k1¡‚ ¡ wh + –(V ¡ R– ¡ T– ¡ Jh): (31)
The ￿rms￿ threat point in wage bargaining is now V ¡ Rﬂ ¡ Tﬂ. Hence, the wage of a worker with
human capital h is determined by
Max
w ›(w)=( Wh ¡ Uh)ﬂ(Jh ¡V + Rﬂ + Tﬂ)1¡ﬂ: (32)
A wage equation is obtained by solving (32) and using (2) and (31)
wh =( 1¡ ﬂ)rUh + ﬂ
h
h‚k1¡‚ ¡ rV +( r + –)(Rﬂ + Tﬂ) ¡ –(R– +T–)
i
: (33)
Inserting the expression for rUh (equation (7)) into (33) yields
wh =
r + – + ￿q(￿)
r +– +ﬂ￿q(￿)
ﬂ(h‚k1¡‚ ¡ rV +( r + –)(Rﬂ + Tﬂ) ¡ –(R– + T–)): (34)
Wage inequality becomes
!¿ =
h‚k1¡‚(1 + ¿)‚ ¡r(V ¡ ¥)
h‚k1¡‚ ¡ r(V ¡ ¥)
: (35)
where
r¥=( r + –)(Rﬂ + Tﬂ) ¡ –(R– + T–): (36)
Costs associated with a ﬂ-separation (Tﬂ and Rﬂ) decrease the ￿rms￿ threat point and thereby de-
creases wage inequality ceteris paribus. By contrast, costs associated with a –-separation (T– and
R–) tend to increase inequality. They decrease the total surplus of a match by an amount that is
independent of the productivity of the worker.
Proposition 11 In the short run an increase in the aggregate education level increases wage in-
equality if tﬂ is low, but decreases wage inequality if tﬂ is high and t– is low.
Proof. Using (3) and (31) yields
rV =
q(￿)E(h‚k1¡‚ ¡ wh ¡–(R– + T–))
r + – + q(￿)
:




(1 ¡ ﬂ)ye ¡ (1 ¡ ﬂ)–(R– + t–ye) ¡ (r + – + ￿q(￿))ﬂ(Rﬂ + tﬂye)
¢
r +– +q(￿)(1 ¡ ﬂ)+ﬂ￿q(￿)
:






(1 ¡ ﬂ) ¡(1 ¡ ﬂ)–t– ¡ (r + – + ￿q(￿))ﬂtﬂ
¢














q(￿)(1 ¡ ﬂ)+t–(r + – + ﬂ￿q(￿)) ¡ tﬂ((r + –)(r + – + q(￿)+ﬂ￿q(￿)) + ﬂq(￿)￿q(￿)) T 0:
Thus,
d(V ¡¥)
d" > 0 for low values of tﬂ,a n d
d(V ¡¥)
d" < 0 for high values of tﬂ and low values of t–:
For low values of tﬂ, V ¡ ¥ increases with ", and hence inequality increases. For high values of
tﬂ and low values of t–, V ¡¥ is more likely to decrease following an increase in the education level.
In the long run, where is free entry and ￿rms choose the amount of physical capital.
Proposition 12 In the long run an increase in the aggregate education level increases the education
premium if and only if V ¡ ¥ is positive.
Proof. Here we only give an outline of the proof which is available on request. Similarly to the proof
of proposition 7, it can be shown that ￿ unique and independent of " and that V is proportional to ye.
Since ¥ also is proportional to ye,a n dye ="k1¡‚, the proposition follows directly from di⁄erentiating
(35) with respect to ":
Propositions 11 and 12 show that our inequality results are robust to both changes in the spec-
i￿cations of the ￿ring taxes and to the introduction of replacement costs. Moreover, we have shown
that ￿ring taxes due to disagreement and due to destruction a⁄ect inequality di⁄erently.
As regards changes in real wages following an increase in " we conjecture that Propositions 4, 5, 8,
and 9 are robust to the above generalization. In the long run an increase in " will have an ambiguous
e⁄ect on real wages if V ¡ ¥ > 0 and otherwise increase real wages for all levels of human capital.
Next we discuss the robustness of the results with respect to other variations of the model. Formal
proofs are available on request. It can be shown that none of our results would change if ￿ring
taxes were proportional to the average wage in the economy. This is because the average wage is
proportional to the average productivity. Our results also hold when ￿ring taxes are indexed on the
average productivity in the ￿rm, rather than the average productivity in the whole economy. If ￿ring
taxes are proportional to the current wage, i.e., depend on the education level of the worker, they do
not a⁄ect inequality directly. The expression for wage inequality coincides with the one presented in
section 3. Hence, changes in wage inequality following a change in " have the same sign as in section
3. Changes in the real wage in response to a change in " have the same sign as in the case with low
￿ring taxes. Similarly, if ￿ring costs were to be redistributed to workers (e.g., severance payments),
they would not a⁄ect wage inequality directly. When severance payments are indexed on the average
productivity, clear cut results are di¢cult to derive without specifying an explicit form of the matching
function. This case seems, however, less relevant as severance payment are typically indexed on the
previous wages.
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